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Supporters of President-elect Roch Marc Kabore cheer at Kabore’s campaign headquarters in Ouagadougou on Dec. 1. Roch Marc Kabore was 
proclaimed the winner of the presidential election in Burkina Faso and will become the country’s first new leader in decades, the Independent 
National Electoral Commission said  Tuesday. (Joe Penney/Reuters) 
On Nov. 29, citizens of Burkina Faso went to the polls to elect a new president and 127 members of parliament. These elections followed a 
turbulent year for the West African nation. In October 2014, former president Blaise Compaoré was displaced after mass protests undermined his 
attempts to change the constitution, which would have allowed him to extend his 27-year-long grip on power. Following Compaoré’s departure, a 
transitional government led by Michel Kafando was installed and national elections were scheduled for mid-October 2015. 
Plans changed, however, on Sept. 16 when a faction of the national army — the presidential guard (known by its French acronym, the RSP) —
 stormed the Presidential Palace during a cabinet meeting, apprehending President Kafando and three other senior members of the transitional 
government. The following day, it was announced on state TV that the traditional government had been dissolved and the commander of the 
presidential guard,General Gilbert Diendéré, was now in charge of the country. 
The RSP and Diendéré’s attempts at a coup d’état, however, were short-lived. Following 10 tense days, which officially cost the lives of 14 citizens, 
the transitional government led by  Kafando was reinstalled and the elections were rescheduled for the end of November. 
On Dec. 1, it was announced that Roch Marc Christian Kaboré won the election with more than 50 percent of the vote and that Kaboré’s party — 
the People’s Movement for Progress (known by its French abbreviation MPP) — also won a plurality of the seats in parliament. It has also 
subsequently been announced that Diendéré, who is  being held in detention for his role in the failed coup, has been charged with complicity in the 
1987 assassination of former president Thomas Sankara, who was murdered in the coup that brought Compaoré to power. 
Throughout the transition period and despite the September coup attempt, international donors have consistently and vocally pushed for elections to 
take place as quickly as possible. The United States, for example, issued a news release   Sept. 30, 2015, arguing that, “It is of utmost importance 
that the transitional government continues its efforts to hold transparent, free, and credible national elections as soon as possible.” 
International donors also poured millions of dollars into supporting the election. In July, for example, the European Union signed a €120 
million budget support agreement with the transitional government, which was intended to keep the government afloat and support the organization 
the forthcoming elections. Other donors supported the government via NGOs, such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI); a pooled funding 
envelope organized by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP); and through material goods, such aspickup trucks from Nigeria 
and computers from Taiwan. 
Burkina Faso is not the only place where donors have pushed for quick elections to end a transitional period. In the Central Africa Republic — a 
country that has been plagued by violence and instability in recent years — donors are pushing for elections to take place at the end of 
December despite concerns about renewed election violence. 
Why is it that during periods of transition, donors place so much emphasis on quick elections, prioritizing election support over other forms of 
democracy promotion and governance-related programming? Qualitative research on the role of donors in elections elsewhere in Africa suggests 
that donors are often apologists for dictatorships, and that the promotion of a rapid transition to multiparty by donors may actually impede further 
democratization efforts. Consistent with these qualitative findings, statistical analysis on therelationship between foreign and democracy suggest that 
at best foreign aid has a marginal effect on democratization. Is donor support for elections merely window-dressing? 
Interviews I conducted with donor officials working for a variety of governmental aid agencies in Burkina Faso in October 2015 suggest that 
electoral support is more than a perfunctory act. That does not mean, however, that the focus on elections is reflective of a deep commitment to 
democratization or multipartyism. 
My findings suggest that donor agencies commit time and money to promoting elections for a simple, functional reason: For development 
practitioners to do their job they need a legitimate, stable partner with whom they can engage. In transition periods, this is lacking. Therefore, donor 
officials are keen to move as quickly as possible out of the transition period. 
Uncertainty regarding political leadership has several practical implications on the daily tasks and professional aspirations of development 
practitioners. Political uncertainties often result in the suspension (formally or informally) of ongoing aid projects and programs that donor officials 
have spent a longtime developing and implementing. This is not only costly for the intended beneficiaries but can affect the professional ambitions 
of aid workers. Development practitioners count on the successful implementation of aid projects to advance professionally. 
Furthermore, if temporary freezes on aid become permanent, donor officials will be forced to pack their bags and head home. When suspensions 
go on for too long, donor agencies may face a cut in their annual budget, resulting in a decline in both resources and staff. In an already unstable 
funding situation, this is something donor officials want to avoid. Once aid is cut, it is frequently difficult to reinstate. 
Even if aid isn’t frozen or suspended, transitional periods make daily tasks more challenging. Donor officials heavily invest in building relationships 
with their counterparts in government. Following a change in government, these relationships disappear, and officials are keen to begin to 
reestablish these relationships as quickly as possible, so that they can get on with doing the job they were sent there to do: disburse aid. 
Finally, the tasks of donor agencies are made easier with a functioning government that has national frameworks and strategies in place. At least 
officially, most donor agencies align their priorities with the recipient country’s national development plan. In Burkina Faso’s case, this is the 
Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (known by its French acronym the SCADD). The SCADD is up at the end of 2015 
and approval was on hold during the transitional period. 
These observations from Burkina Faso are consistent with survey research I conducted across twenty African countries in 2014. In this case, I 
found that willingness of donor agencies to sanction recipient governments for political transgressions is not just dependent on the strategic interests 
of donor countries, but also on the motivations and interests of the donor agency itself. Similarly, more specialized research on democratic 
promotion byinternational NGOs suggests that the organizational incentives of these agencies are an important, but often overlooked, part of the 
story. 
When donor agencies engage in democracy promotion, they don’t just bring along the normative objectives and the strategic interests of their 
funders. They are also motivated by much more mundane organizational incentives. 
In the case of Burkina Faso, quick elections may have been the smart move. This is not, however, necessarily the case everywhere. Unfortunately, 
in practice, decision-making is often driven by the functional needs of particular agencies, rather than a sound assessment of the political situation 
in the recipient country. With only limited funding available, this pattern of behavior of behavior means that more fundamental democratic reforms 
are often sidelined in favor of the ballot box. 
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